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PROGNOSIS FOR SYNERGY BETWEEN
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND
BUNDLED PAYMENTS IN MEDICARE
Peter Fise
I INTRODUCTION
Due to the significant political and external pressures to better control
United States federal spending over the near and long-term, efforts to
generate savings in the Medicare program have become central to budget
policymakers' concerns. Recognizing these concerns, the 2010 health care
reform law-the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148),
as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010
(P.L. 111-152), and referred to collectively as the Affordable Care Act
("ACA")-required that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
("CMS") establish a Medicare Shared Savings Program ("MSSP") for
Accountable Care Organizations ("ACOs").1 The ACA also required CMS
to develop a National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling2 within the
Medicare system. Both programs are intended to change the way health care
is delivered to Medicare beneficiaries by incentivizing coordination and
integration of care, which ultimately produces savings for the Medicare
program.3 In implementing these new payment models, it will be critical for
CMS to structure the programs in a manner that allows the models to work
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1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3022,
10,307, 124 Stat. 119, 395, 940 (2010) (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006), by adding § 1899, "Shared Savings Program") [hereinafter
PPACA].
2. Id. §§ 3023, 10,308 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act by adding §
1866D, "National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling").
3. Social Security Act § 1899(a)(1); see also Social Security Act § 1866D(a)(1).
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in tandem, layering bundled payments within the context of the MSSP to
ensure that providers are given incentives to coordinate care and hold down
costs at both the global per-beneficiary level and the per-episode of care
level. Furthermore, in allowing for contemporaneous participation in both
the ACO model and bundled payments, CMS will need to allocate payment
incentives from each program in a way that avoids duplicative shared
savings payments in order to maximize the promise of these provider
payment reforms.
A. Statutory Framework for ACOs
Section 3022 of the ACA established the MSSP for ACOS4 and includes
various requirements that must be satisfied by a provider or group of
providers seeking to enroll as an ACO in the MSSP. Under Congress'
vision for ACOs, the program will encourage providers to establish new
health care entities that coordinate care for an assigned group of at least
5,000 Medicare beneficiaries, in a manner that reduces costs through the
elimination of duplicative services and the removal of inefficiencies
associated with fragmented care across settings.6 To incentivize the
formation of such entities, the program allows ACOs to share with Medicare
a portion of the savings that result through the reduction of expenditures per
beneficiary, as compared to pre-determined spending benchmarks.7
Importantly, the Social Security Act section 1899(i), added by ACA
section 3022, allows CMS to pursue other payment options deemed
appropriate for ACOs. Under this statutory authority, CMS proposed and
4. See PPACA § 3022.
5. Social Security Act § 1899(b)(2)(D) (requiring that "at a minimum, the ACO
shall have at least 5,000 such beneficiaries assigned to it under subsection (c) in order to
be eligible to participate in the ACO program").
6. Social Security Act § 1899(a)(1).
7. Social Security Act § 1899(d)(1)(B)(i) (authorizing payments to ACOs for shared
savings "if the estimated average per capita Medicare expenditures under the ACO for
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries for parts A and B services, adjusted for beneficiary
characteristics, is at least the percent specified by the Secretary below the applicable
benchmark").
8. Social Security Act § 1899(i)(2) (authorizing the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to "use any of the payment models .. . for making payments
under the program rather than the payment model described in subsection (d)"-which is
the traditional one-sided model shared savings model-and stipulating that a partial
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finalized both a one-sided risk model and a two-sided risk model.9 Under
the one-sided model, ACOs are eligible to share in the savings generated
through care coordination, but are not financially responsible for losses
which result when the cost of care exceeds pre-determined benchmarks.' 0
Under the two-sided model, ACOs must assume financial risk for a
percentage of the losses that result when the expenditures for a given
beneficiary exceed the benchmark level." The two-sided model for ACO
shared savings participation is designed to ensure that individual providers
within the ACO have appropriate incentives to limit excess use and
counterbalance the continuation of fee-for-service ("FFS") physician
reimbursement through the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule ("PFS"),
which incentivizes greater utilization of health care services.' 2
The concern, raised by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
("MedPAC"), is that under a one-sided model approach to ACO shared
savings-in which the ACO assumes no risk of losses-individual
capitation model is one "in which an ACO is at financial risk for some, but not all, of the
items and services covered under parts A and B . . . such as at risk for some or all
physicians' services or all items and services under part B" and clarifying that "[tihe
Secretary may limit a partial capitation model to ACOs that are highly integrated systems
of care and to ACOs capable of bearing risk, as determined to be appropriate by the
Secretary").
9. Medicare Program: Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,977-67985 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 425) (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 425 by adding § 425.200(b)(2) to establish that
"for 2013 and all subsequent years, the term of the agreement is 3 years" and by adding §
425.600 to require that during the first 3-year agreement period, MSSP participating
ACOs must elect to operate under either "Track 1," which operates under a "one-sided
model" that allows ACOs to share in savings generated without assuming risk for losses
incurred when per-beneficiary expenditure levels exceed per-beneficiary benchmarks; or
alternatively operate under "Track 2," which requires the ACO to assume downside risk,
but also offers ACOs a greater percentage share of savings generated. New section
425.600(c) requires that in all subsequent three-year agreement periods-following the
first 3-year agreement period-an ACO must elect to operate under "Track 2.").
10. Id. at 67,975.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 67,908; see also MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY (2011), http://medpac.gov/documents/
Mar11_EntireReport.pdf.
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physicians within the ACO would find that their potential individual benefit
received through the ACO's distribution of shared savings (generated
through containment of service volume growth) could easily be outweighed
by the financial incentive to continue to drive volume growth (because
physicians participating in ACOs are still reimbursed for physician services
under the Medicare PFS).13 While the final regulations establishing the
MSSP allow for ACOs to elect to operate under either the one-sided model
or the two-sided model during the entirety of the initial 3-year agreement
period, CMS used its authority (under Social Security Act section 1899(i)) to
require that ACOs seeking to engage in subsequent 3-year agreements, after
the initial 3-year agreement, must elect to operate under the two-sided
model. 14
B. Statutory Framework for Bundled Payments
Section 3023 of the ACA requires the establishment of a National Pilot
Program on Payment Bundling,15 which will test a new payment system
within Medicare FFS that provides consolidated payment for a single
"episode of care." The bundled payment will be calculated by integrating
Medicare payments for hospital inpatient and outpatient services, physician
services provided both inside and outside of the hospital setting, emergency
room services, and post-acute care services. 16 While the bundled payment
13. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, COMMENT ON THE CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES (CMS) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 3
(2010), http://medpac.gov/documents/1 1222010_ACOCOMMENT_MedPAC.pdf
(noting that "in a bonus-only model there is some incentive to control spending for
services from providers outside the ACO. But that incentive is weaker for services the
ACO provides directly because the ACO still receives FFS payments for those services
and those payments are certain."); see also Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings
Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,904 (suggesting that while
a "one-sided model" ACO payment structure "may provide incentive for participants to
improve quality, it may not be enough of an incentive for participants to improve the
efficiency and cost of health care delivery").
14. 42 C.F.R. § 425.600(a)-(b) (2012).
15. See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3023, 124 Stat. 119, 399 (2010).
16. Social Security Act § 1860D(a)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006) (establishing that
"applicable services" covered for single unified payment under an "episode of care" in
the National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling consist of "(i) Acute care inpatient
services[;] (ii) Physicians' services delivered in and outside of an acute care hospital
setting[;] (iii) Outpatient hospital services, including emergency department services[;]
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model allows providers to retain any amount by which the actual cost of care
was below the bundled payment for the episode, it simultaneously requires
providers to assume financial risk for any amount by which the actual cost of
care exceeds the bundled payment amount for the episode.'
Under the ACA, the National Pilot must be established by January 1,
2013, and will operate for five years.'8 The National Pilot will test this
payment model on up to 10 conditions selected and deemed appropriate by
CMS.19 Importantly, Social Security Act section 1866D(c)(1)(B), added by
ACA section 3023, authorizes CMS to expand the scope and duration of the
program at any point after 2016-potentially incorporating bundled
payments across the Medicare FFS program-so long as the National Pilot
demonstrates the capacity to generate Medicare savings while ensuring high
20quality care.
(iv) Post-acute care services, including home health services, skilled nursing services,
inpatient rehabilitation services, and inpatient hospital services furnished by a long-term
care hospital[; and] (v) Other services the Secretary determines appropriate.").
17. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: REFORMING THE
DELIVERY SYSTEM 83-101 (2008), http://medpac.gov/documents/Jun08 EntireReport.pdf
[hereinafter REFORMING THE DELIVERY SYSTEM].
18. Social Security Act § 1866D(a)(3); see also Social Security Act §
1866D(c)(1)(A).
19. Social Security Act § 1866D(a)(2)(D) (establishing that the term applicable
condition "means 1 or more of 10 conditions selected by the Secretary" and requiring that
"in selecting conditions under the preceding sentence, the Secretary shall take into
consideration the following factors: (i) Whether the conditions selected include a mix of
chronic and acute conditions[;] (ii) Whether the conditions selected include a mix of
surgical and medical conditions[;] (iii) Whether a condition is one for which there is
evidence of an opportunity for providers of services and suppliers to improve the quality
of care furnished while reducing total expenditures . . . [;] (iv) Whether a condition has
significant variation in--(I) the number of readmissions; and (II) the amount of
expenditures for post-acute care spending . .. [;] (v) Whether a condition is high-volume
and has high post-acute care expenditures . .. [; and] (vi) Which conditions the Secretary
determines are most amenable to bundling across the spectrum of care given practice
patterns").
20. Social Security Act § 1866D(c)(1)(B) (establishing that "The Secretary may, at
any point after January 1, 2016, expand the duration and scope of the pilot program, to
the extent determined appropriate by the Secretary, if-(i) the Secretary determines that
such expansion is expected to-(I) reduce spending under title XVIII of the Social
Security Act without reducing the quality of care; or (II) improve the quality of care and
ACOs and Bundled Payments
C. Rulemaking and Implementation ofEach Model
In November 2011, CMS published a final rule to establish the MSSP for
ACOs. 2 1 At the same time, the CMS Center for Medicare and Medicaid
22Innovation ("CMMI") separately launched the Pioneer ACO Model. In
addition to providing two tracks for ACOs to choose to operate under, the
MSSP final rule provides the framework for ACO shared savings payment
determinations.23 ACOs must report on their performance of providing
quality care based on 33 quality metrics established by CMS.24 The ACO's
aggregate quality performance score then determines the ACO's "sharing
rate," or the percentage of shared savings that the ACO will be allowed to
retain.25 ACOs achieving the highest quality scores will receive the highest
sharing rates.26 Under the final rule, the maximum sharing rate for track one
reduce spending; (ii) the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
certifies that such expansion would reduce program spending under such title XVIII; and
(iii) the Secretary determines that such expansion would not deny or limit the coverage or
provision of benefits under this title for individuals").
21. Medicare Program: Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,802-990 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 425).
22. Medicare Program; Pioneer Accountable Care Organization Model: Request for
Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,244, 29,249-50 (May 20, 2011) (announcing the request
for applications for the Pioneer ACO program); see generally CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID INNOVATION (CMMI), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS),
PIONEER ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION (ACO) MODEL REQUEST FOR APPLICATION
(2011), http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/x/Pioneer-ACO-Model-Request-For-
Applications-document.pdf.
23. Medicare Program: Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,802-990.
24. Id at 67,889-90 (amending 42 C.F.R. § 425.500 by adding § 425.500(d) to
establish quality metrics across four measure domains: "(i) patient/care giver experience;
(ii) care coordination; (iii) preventative health; and (iv) at-risk population").
25. Id. at 67,986-87.
26. Id. at 67,984 (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 425 by adding § 425.502(e) to provide
that: "(1) CMS scores individual measures and determines the corresponding number of
points that may be earned based on an ACO's performance. (2) CMS adds the points
earned for the individual measures within the domain and divides by the total points
available for the domain to determine the domain score. (3) Domains are weighted
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ACOs is set at 50%-meaning that ACOs in this track may share in a
maximum of 50% of the savings generated relative to the per-beneficiary
benchmarks.2 7 Meanwhile, the maximum sharing rate for track two ACOs is
28
set at 60%-meaning that they share in a maximum of 60% of the savings.
For track two ACOs, the ACO's "shared loss rate"-or the percentage of
actual costs in excess of the per-beneficiary benchmark that must be
absorbed by the ACO-is equal to one minus the ACO's shared savings
rate.29 For example, if a track two ACO's sharing rate is 45%, then its
shared loss rate would be 55%. This would mean that the ACO would be
financially responsible for 55% of the excess costs above the per-beneficiary
benchmark, with the Medicare program becoming financially responsible for
the remainder. The final rule created a maximum shared loss rate of 60%.30
Additionally, the final rule establishes minimum levels of savings, relative
to the benchmarks, that must be achieved before ACOs may share in
savings. This is referred to as the minimum savings rate or MSR.31 For
track one ACOs, the MSR ranges from 2% to 3.9%, depending on the size of
the ACO,32 while track two ACOs have a uniform 2% MSR regardless of
equally and scores averaged to determine the ACO's overall performance score and
sharing rate.").
27. Id at 67,986 (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 425 by adding § 425.604(d) to establish
that an ACO participating in the one-sided model may receive "a shared savings payment
of up to 50 percent of all savings under the updated benchmark").
28. Id. at 67,987 (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 425 by adding § 425.606(d) to establish
that an ACO participating in the two-sided model may receive "shared savings payments
of up to 60 percent of all the savings under the updated benchmark").
29. Medicare Program: Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,987 (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 425 by adding §
425.606(f) to establish that when "an ACO ... is required to share losses with the
Medicare program for expenditures over the updated benchmark, the of amount of shared
losses is determined based on the inverse of its final sharing rate . .. (that is, 1 minus the
final shared savings rate)").
30. Id.
31. Id. at 67,986 (amending 42 C.F.R. § 425 by adding § 425.604(b) to require that
"CMS uses a sliding scale, based on the number of beneficiaries assigned to the ACO.to
establish the MSR for an ACO participating under the one-sided model").
32. Id.
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size. 3 3  So, for example, if an ACO has an MSR of 2.5%, the total
expenditures for beneficiaries assigned to that ACO must be at least 2.5%
below the pre-determined benchmark expenditure level in order for the ACO
to share in any savings. The application of the MSR is designed to ensure
that ACOs are not awarded shared savings for savings that are generated
through random variation in costs, rather than actual care coordination. 34
Similarly, the final rule limits maximum shared savings to a percentage of
35the benchmark. Under this structure, track one ACOs' shared savings are
capped at 10% of the benchmark,36 while track two ACOs' shared savings
are capped at 15% of the benchmark.37  Finally, track two ACOs' shared
losses are also capped at certain percentages of the benchmark under a
similar structure.3 Essentially, track two ACOs will not be financially
responsible for losses in excess of the shared loss cap, which is applied at
5%, 7.5%, and 10% for years one through three, respectively, of the first
MSSP agreement period.
33. Id. at 67,987 (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 425 by adding § 425.606(b)(1) to require
that "[t]o qualify for shared savings under the two-sided model, an ACO's average per
capita Medicare expenditures for the performance year must be below its updated
benchmark costs for the year by at least 2 percent.").
34. Id. at 67,927.
35. Medicare Program: Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,934.
36. Id. at 67,986 (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 425 to add § 425.604(e)(2) to require that
"the amount of shared savings an eligible ACO receives under the one-sided model may
not exceed 10 percent of its updated benchmark.").
37. Id. at 67,987 (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 425 to add § 425.606(e)(2) to require that
"the amount of shared savings an eligible ACO receives under the two-sided model may
not exceed 15 percent of its updated benchmark.").
38. Id. at 67,937.
39. Id. at 67,987 (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 425 to add § 425.606(g) to establish that
"the amount of shared losses for which an eligible ACO is liable may not exceed the
following percentages of its updated benchmark . . . (1) 5 percent in the first performance
year in a two-sided model under the Shared Savings Program; (2) 7.5 percent in the
second performance year; (3) 10 percent in the third and any subsequent performance
year").
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In establishing the Pioneer ACO Model, CMMI utilized its authority
under Social Security Act section 11 15A, which was added by section 3021
of the ACA, 4 0 to pilot and test an alternative Medicare payment system in
which Pioneer ACOs enrolling in the new CMMI program are eligible for
substantially higher percentage shares of savings generated, in exchange for
assuming more downside risk and agreeing to move towards a capitated
payment model.41 Under this model participating ACOs would become
more fully responsible for expenditures above the predetermined beneficiary
benchmarks over the course of a 5-year agreement period. Additionally,
ACOs would be entitled to up to 70% of all of the Medicare savings
42
generated by holding costs below the benchmarks. Pioneer ACO sharing
rates would be determined under the same quality performance rubric that
govern the MSSP sharing rates, 43 but in addition to being subject to higher
sharing rates and shared loss rates (relative to the MSSP levels), they would
44
also be subject to higher sharing caps and shared loss caps.
40. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3021(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 389 (2010)
(amending the Social Security Act by adding § 11 15A, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (2006), to
establish within CMS the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to "test
innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program expenditures under
the applicable titles while preserving or enhancing the quality of care furnished to
individuals under such titles.").
41. CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID INNOVATION (CMMI), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS), supra note 22, at 8. (stating that CMMI is "interested in
testing alternative payment models that: (1) include escalating levels of financial
accountability through successive periods during the Participation Agreement; (2)
provide a transition from fee-for-service to population-based payment by the third
performance period; and (3) generate Medicare savings").
42. Id.
43. Id. at 17 (explaining that "performance measures will mirror those in the final
regulations for the Shared Savings Program" and those quality scores for Pioneer ACOs
will determine the ACO's sharing rate for the purposes of retention of shared savings).
44. Id. at 8 (clarifying that in performance year one, Pioneer ACOs will be eligible to
receive up to 60 percent of shared savings and will be accountable for up to 60 percent of
shared losses, and in performance year two, Pioneer ACOs will be eligible for up to 70
percent of shared savings and will be accountable for up to 70 percent of shared losses);
see also id. at 17 (noting that quality incentive calculations will be "updated to be
consistent with final regulations for the Shared Saving Program," which indicates that
CMMI may increase the maximum sharing rates, sharing caps, and shared loss caps to
reflect increases in each under the MSSP final rule-in a manner that ensures that
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Under the Pioneer ACO Program's Core Payment Arrangement, in
performance year three, Pioneer ACOs that generate a minimum average
annual savings over performance years one and two will "transition to
population-based payment in period three," with population-based payment
defined as a "per-beneficiary per month payment amount intended to replace
a significant portion of the ACO's FFS with a prospective payment." In
the population-based payment structure, Pioneer ACOs will continue to
receive Medicare FFS payment "at 50 percent of fee-for-service payment
rates on submitted claims," and will receive monthly population-based
payments that will equal "the remainder of the ACO's projected FFS
revenue for its aligned Medicare patients."46 For example, if an aligned
beneficiary for a Pioneer ACO had projected monthly Medicare FFS costs of
$750 and actually incurred $600 in FFS claims, the ACO would receive 50%
of the FFS payment rate on the actual FFS claims-or $300-and would
receive $375 in a monthly population-based payment. 47 However, if the
same beneficiary incurred $900 in actual FFS claims, the ACO would
receive $450 (50% of $900) in Medicare FFS payments and a $375 monthly
population-based payment. Under this structure, Pioneer ACOs generate
positive revenue margins-relative to traditional Medicare FFS payments-
when the beneficiary's costs are held below projected levels; but they are
financially at risk in instances where the beneficiary's costs exceed the
Pioneer ACO's projected level.
The Pioneer ACO Program was designed to act as an alternative to the
MSSP49 for experienced clinically-integrated health systems that assume
Pioneer ACO maximum sharing rates, sharing caps, and shared loss caps are greater than
those included under the MSSP, as originally intended).
45. Id. (clarifying that the minimum average annual savings amount for qualification
to transition to population-based payment "will be no greater than 5% (for ACOs in states
with the lowest historical Medicare expenditure levels) and no less than 1% (for ACOs
in states with the highest historical Medicare expenditure levels), and will vary inversely
with the relative Medicare expenditure level in the state where the ACO is located").
46. CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID INNOVATION (CMMI), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS), supra note 22, at 9.
47. Id. at 35-36.
48. Id.
49. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS), PIONEER ACO MODEL:
GENERAL FACT SHEET 1 (2011), http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Pioneer-
ACO-General-Fact-Sheet.pdf
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greater levels of downside risk and financial responsibility for beneficiary
costs.50 Importantly, Social Security Act section 11 15A(c) grants CMS the
authority to expand payment models tested at CMMI to the entire Medicare
program, provided that the Secretary of HHS (in consultation with the CMS
Chief Actuary) determines that the model will reduce Medicare spending
without reducing beneficiaries' access to benefits and services, or decreasing
quality of care. Given this sweeping authority, it is conceivable that the
Pioneer ACO Program, if successful, could be expanded to operate as a
permanent alternative option for all potential ACOs, in addition to the
MSSP's track one and track two options.
In August 2011, CMMI issued a request for applications for its Bundled
Payments for Care Improvement Initiative,52 which, while not explicitly a
part of the National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, serves as a useful
insight into the potential constructs of the National Pilot. The Initiative is
composed of four separate payment models in which providers may enroll.
Due to this Comment's focus on aligning hospital payments and physician
payments in Medicare, this discussion will focus on Models One and Four,
which address hospital inpatient stays and physician services associated with
inpatient stays, while Models Two and Three, which focus on post-acute
50. Id. at 2.
51. Social Security Act § 1115(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006) (authorizing the
Secretary of HHS to, "through rulemaking, expand (including implementation on a
nationwide basis) the duration and the scope of a model that is being tested ... if (1) the
Secretary determines that such expansion is expected to-(A) reduce spending under
applicable title without reducing the quality of care; or (B) improve the quality of patient
care without increasing spending; (2) the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services certifies that such expansion would reduce (or would not result in any
increase in) net program spending under applicable titles; and (3) the Secretary
determines that such expansion would not deny or limit the coverage or provision of
benefits under the applicable title for applicable individuals.").
52. Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative: Request for Application, 76
Fed. Reg. 53,137, 53,137-54,138 (Aug. 25, 2011) (announcing the request for
applications for the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative); see generally
CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID INNOVATION (CMMI), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID SERvS. (CMS), BUNDLED PAYMENTS FOR CARE IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE
REQUEST FOR APPLICATION (2011), http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/x/Bundled-
Payments-for-Care-Improvement-Request-for-Applications.pdf [hereinafter BUNDLED
PAYMENTS FOR CARE].
53. BUNDLED PAYMENTS FOR CARE, supra note 52.
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care services rather than physician services, will not be addressed. Each
model requires providers to negotiate and enter into agreements with CMMI
that allow for discounted target payments of different episodes of care.54 To
the extent that clinically-integrated providers are able to hold down costs
below the targets, participating providers will be allowed to retain the
surplus generated.5
Under the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative's "Model
One," an episode of care is defined as an "acute inpatient hospital stay for all
Medicare FFS beneficiaries" admitted to an acute care inpatient hospital of a
Bundled Payment participating provider, irrespective of condition or
severity. An episode includes "all Medicare Part A services furnished to
included beneficiaries during the hospital stay," but excludes physician
services reimbursed under Medicare Part B. Physician services will
continue to be reimbursed under the Medicare PFS, but the hospital's
physicians "will be permitted to share gains"-referred to as "gainsharing"
arrangements-arising from holding Medicare Part A service costs below
the agreed upon, discounted Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment
System ("IPPS") payment rate for the particular condition.5 By the third
year of the initiative, Bundled Payment-participating providers will be
expected to offer "a minimum 2% discount to Medicare on all Part A
hospital inpatient payments."59 By employing an allowance for gainsharing
between hospitals and physicians, this Model seems to have a goal of
aligning payment incentives between (1) acute care inpatient hospitals that
are paid pre-set payment rates based on patient condition and severity,
regardless of actual costs of treatment; and (2) hospital-based physicians that
are paid on a fee-for-service basis for each service delivered.
In "Model Four," CMMI will provide a single prospective payment of a
pre-determined amount for all Medicare Part A inpatient hospital services
and Medicare Part B physician services "for episodes of inpatient
hospitalization for [participant] selected conditions."6 The duration of an
54. Id. at 11.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 10.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 11.
59. BUNDLED PAYMENTS FOR CARE, supra note 52.
60. Id. at 20.
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episode will consist of the three days prior to initial hospital admission
through any related readmission.61 Bundled Payment participants are
expected to offer a single target price that "includes a single rate of discount
off of the expected Medicare Part A and Part B payments for all hospital
facility and [physician] professional services furnished during the
hospitalization" for agreed-upon conditions that constitute episodes of
care.62 CMMI expects Model Four participants to offer a discount of at least
3% of estimated average combined Part A and Part B expenses for the given
condition.63 Establishing a capped, combined Part A and Part B payment
rate for all services delivered in connection with a particular inpatient
condition provides even stronger incentives for physicians to work with the
hospital to eliminate unnecessary or duplicative services and constrain
utilization growth rates that drive aggregate increases in Medicare
expenditures.
II. OUTLOOK OF ACOS AND BUNDLED PAYMENTS: ASSESSING
ACHIEVEMENT OF PRIOR MODELS
The genesis of both models stems from recommendations offered by
MedPAC, Congress' advisory body on Medicare payment and benefit design
issues. In its June 2009 Report to Congress, MedPAC recommended that
the Secretary of HHS institute a shared savings program for ACOs.64 In its
June 2008 Report to Congress, MedPAC recommended the establishment of
a voluntary bundling pilot within Medicare.6 5 Both models have been
extensively tested by both CMS and private payers. The results of these
demonstration projects and private-sector payment initiatives provide case-
studies that have been reviewed by CMS and others in ongoing development
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id at 21.
64. See generally MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 39-56 (2009),
http://medpac.gov/documents/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf [hereinafter IMPROVING
INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM].
65. REFORMING THE DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 85.
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of both the ACO program and the bundled payment pilot required by the
ACA.6 6
A. Shared Savings Models in Medicare Demonstrations and in the Private
Sector
In developing a framework for the MSSP for ACOs, CMS must carefully
balance the need to ensure that the MSSP generates savings for the Medicare
program with the need to ensure that a sufficient number of providers form
ACOs and enroll in the voluntary program.67 If the ACOs' shares of savings
are too limited, few provider groups will be incentivized to participate. On
the other hand, if shared savings are too generous, the Medicare program
will not accrue sufficient savings to make the program worthwhile. Several
case studies of shared savings successes and pitfalls exist, some of which
will be reviewed here.
Since 2003, the Medicare Physician Group Practice ("PGP")
Demonstration has tested the efficacy of allowing large, integrated physician
group practices to share in Medicare savings Xroduced from care
coordination in a manner similar to the ACO design. The Medicare PGP
66. HARRIET L. KoMISAR ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, "BUNDLING" PAYMENT
FOR EPISODES OF HOSPITAL CARE 7 (2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/pdf/medicare bundling.pdf (noting that
the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration, the Medicare Acute Care
Episode Demonstration, the PROMETHEUS Payment Model, and Geisinger Health
System's ProvenCare program all provide valuable instances of "previous experience
with bundled payments for hospital episodes"); see also IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE
MEDICARE PROGRAM, supra note 64, at 40 (noting that "the current [Medicare] Physician
Group Practice (PGP) demonstration provides an example of how a bonus-only voluntary
ACO design might work.").
67. Social Security Act § 1899(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b) (2006) (establishing the
criteria for groups of providers that are eligible to enter into 3-year ACO agreements with
the Secretary).
68. Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 412, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (requiring the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to conduct demonstration projects to test incentives that
would be designed to encourage coordination of care furnished under Medicare Parts A
and B by institutional and other providers); see also KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, SEC'Y OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE
DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION REPORT 23-24 (2009),
https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/PGP RTCSept.pdf
[hereinafter PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION REPORT].
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Demonstration offers substantially higher sharing rates than can be received
by ACOs in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, as Medicare PGP
Demonstration sites are entitled to retain up to 80% of Medicare savings
generated relative to pre-determined expenditure targets, provided that the
PGP Demonstration sites meet or exceed performance targets for quality
improvement.69 In 2010, the fifth year of full implementation of the
demonstration, all ten Medicare PGP Demonstration sites met quality
performance benchmarks on at least thirty out of thirty-two quality
measures, and all PGP sites increased quality scores relative to the baseline
performance year.70 However, the Medicare PGP Demonstration produced
only moderate savings in 2010, as only four out of ten participating PGP
Demonstration sites produced savings.7
The Medicare PGP Demonstration sites are slightly larger than the
projected average-size ACO (Medicare PGP sites averaging 21,940 assigned
72beneficiaries, as compared to projected MSSP-participating ACOs
69. PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION REPORT, supra note
68, at 4-5 (explaining that "PGPs can receive performance payments of up to 80 percent
of the Medicare expenditures that are saved in a performance year. To receive the full
performance payment, PGP sites must meet or exceed performance targets established for
ambulatory care quality measures.").
70. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS), MEDICARE PHYSICIAN
GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION: PHYSICIAN GROUPS CONTINUE TO IMPROVE QUALITY
AND GENERATE SAVINGS UNDER MEDICARE PHYSICIAN PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE
DEMONSTRATION 5-6 (2011), https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/
downloads/PGP FactSheet.pdf (finding that "all ten physician groups achieved
benchmark performance on at least 30 of 32 measures. Seven groups . . . achieved
benchmark performance on all 32 performance measures" and finding that "PGPs have
increased their quality scores from baseline to performance year 5 an average of 11
percentage points on diabetes measures, 12 percentage points on heart failure measures, 6
percentage points on coronary artery measures, 9 percentage points on cancer screening
measures, and 4 percentage points on hypertension measures.").
71. Id. (finding that four Medicare PGP demonstration sites earned incentive
payments based on the estimated savings in Medicare expenditures for the patient
population they serve. The groups received performance payments totaling $29.4 million
as their share of the $36.2 million of savings generated for the Medicare Trust Fund in
performance year 5).
72. PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION REPORT, supra note
68, at 26 (indicating that total assigned beneficiaries for Medicare PGP demonstration
sites ranged from 9,700 assigned beneficiaries at The Everett Clinic to 38,700 assigned
beneficiaries at the Marshfield Clinic).
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averaging 19,259 assigned beneficiaries73 ) and PGP sites are experienced
forerunners in clinical integration. Therefore, the lack of consistent
generation of savings amongst PGP sites is not a promising indicator of
potential MSSP success. Critics of the MSSP and ACO model could argue
that if large, clinically-integrated health systems and multispecialty group
practices with extensive experience in capitated payment systems, such as
the Medicare PGP Demonstration sites, cannot achieve Medicare savings in
a shared savings model, it is unlikely that smaller, less experienced ACOs
could achieve significant savings in the MSSP.
However, it is important to note that Medicare PGP Demonstration sites
were not required to assume downside risk,74 in the manner that all ACOs
will be required to by the second three-year agreement period under the
MSSP.75 In many ways, this reality reflects the importance of downside risk
in constraining utilization and volume growth. The requirement for ACOs
to eventually enter into the two-sided model could allow the MSSP-
participating providers to generate savings at a level that the Medicare PGP
Demonstration sites could not. Similarly, the transition to population-based
73. Medicare Program: Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,980 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 425) (indicating that CMS's Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Medicare Shared
Savings Program Final Rule projects that between "I to 5 million Medicare beneficiaries
would align with between 50 to 270 ACOs during the first four years for the program." In
this paper we assume-for the purposes determining projected average ACO size-that if
1 million beneficiaries were aligned with ACOs, then the total number of enrolled ACOs
would equal 50 and result in ACOs averaging 20,000 assigned beneficiaries; and also
assume that if 5 million beneficiaries were aligned with ACOs, then the total number of
enrolled ACOs would equal 270 and result in ACOs averaging 18,518 assigned
beneficiaries. Under these assumptions, by averaging the high and low end projected
assigned beneficiary levels per-ACO, we can project that the average MSSP-participating
ACO would be assigned 19,259 beneficiaries.).
74. PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION REPORT, supra note
68, at 9 (explaining that "if actual expenditures fall within 98 percent to 102 percent of
the target, the PGP is deemed to not have saved Medicare expenditures and is not eligible
for performance payments" and "if actual expenditures exceed 102 percent of target
expenditures, the PGP will received no performance payments and is considered to have
achieved negative Medicare savings;" however aside from the "negative Medicare
savings" classification of the PGP, there are no negative consequences, financial or
otherwise, for PGPs that allow actual expenditures to exceed target expenditure levels).
75. Medicare Program: Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,985.
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payments in the Pioneer ACO Program could create much stronger
incentives for Pioneer ACO providers to reduce excess, unnecessary
utilization. Specifically, achieving expenditure levels that are below
monthly population-based payments would allow Pioneer ACOs to maintain
improved profit margins.
Second, on the private payer side, the "Alternative Quality Contract"
("AQC") payment model employed by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Massachusetts ("BCBS") offers a valuable example of ACOs that could
develop. This model is particularly relevant in light of the fact that
assumption of downside risk appears to be a key component in incentivizing
the generation of savings by ACO providers within shared savings models.
The AQC model allows providers to share in savings produced when
patient-specific spending baseline budgets are met and requires providers to
share with BCBS in the losses resulting when the patient-specific
77benchmarks are exceeded. Specifically, AQC participant provider groups
are eligible for pay-for-performance bonus payments of up to 10% of the
spending baseline budgets. This is analogous to sharing caps in the MSSP
context. The budget baselines are negotiated between BCBS and AQC
participant groups and include all inpatient and outpatient hospital facility
services, physician services, rehabilitation facility services, long-term care,
and prescription drug costs. 7 9
The AQC payment model produced average quarterly savings levels of
1.9% when compared to average spending for BCBS enrollees with similar
health conditions who were not in the AQC system.so AQC groups earned
an average bonus payment of 3% of the baseline budget and research
suggests that total payments by BCBS to AQC groups actually increased
relative to the payments the groups were projected to otherwise receive.
Additionally, researchers found that AQC savings were achieved through
76. Id.
77. Michael Chemew et al., Private Payer Innovation In Massachusetts: The
Alternative Quality Contract, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1, 51-52 (2011).
78. Zirui Song et al., Health Care Spending and Quality in Year 1 of the Alternative
Quality Contract, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 909, 910 (2011).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 909.
81. Id. at 913, 915.
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changes in referral patterns rather than through changes in utilization. This
occurred particularly through shifts from more expensive outpatient care
services to facilities with lower fees; lower expenditures for procedures,
imaging, and testing; and reductions in spending on the highest cost
enrollees.82 However, AQC participant groups displayed improved cuality
scores in their patients relative to patients treated in non-AQC settings. 3
The AQC Year One results demonstrate that blending the incentives
associated with shared savings and those associated with shared losses can
spur positive changes in the trajectory of health care spending. While the
health care costs continued to increase in the AQC model (relative to
previous years), the costs increased at a slower rate than the cost-growth rate
for similarly situated populations without AQC model intervention.84 This
is encouraging for the MSSP, as this slowing of the cost-growth rate is the
precise purpose of the Shared Savings Program. However, the rather
minimal cost savings produced relative to non-AQC providers should be
concerning for policymakers. The 1.9% savings generated by AQC groups
falls within the range of savings that could be attributed to random variation
in expenditures, for which ACOs in the MSSP would not be awarded shared
savings.
The propensity of both the Medicare PGP demonstration sites and the
AQC participant groups to drive improvements in clinical quality
demonstrates the non-budgetary value of the ACO model. If nothing else,
the evidence suggesting improved care quality within shared savings
payment structures should be encouraging to observers assessing the
promise of the ACO model.
B. Bundled Payments in Medicare Demonstrations & Private-Sector
Payments
As CMS works to advance the bundled payment strategy through both the
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative and the National Pilot
Program on Payment Bundling, it will be critical to consider the successes
and setbacks of various Medicare demonstrations and private-sector
payment initiatives that attempted to implement bundled payments.
82. Id. at 909.
83. Id. at 913 (showing AQC quality improvement reflected as an "increase of 2.6
percentage points in the proportion of eligible enrollees for whom quality thresholds for
chronic care management were met; and an increase of 0.7 percentage points in the
proportion of eligible enrollees for whom pediatric care thresholds were met.").
84. Song et al., supra note 78, at 909.
2012 313
314 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXVIII:2
Identifiable characteristics of successful programs should then be reflected
in a National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling. CMS has a wealth of
experience in testing early models of bundled payments, specifically through
its implementation of (1) the Medicare Acute Care Episode (ACE)
Demonstration; and (2) the Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration.
Additionally, Geisinger Health System's ProvenCare@ payment initiative
can serve as a model for bundling of payments across acute and post-acute
care settings.87
The Medicare ACE Demonstration allowed participating hospital groups
to receive a global bundled payment rate for all Medicare Part A and
Medicare Part B services for a given medical condition88 within the scope of
85. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 646, 117 Stat. 2066, 2324-25 (2003) (amends the Social Security Act
by adding new section 1866C to authorize the Secretary of HHS to "approve
demonstration projects that examine health delivery factors that encourage the delivery of
improved quality in patient care, including the provision of incentives for improving the
quality and safety of care and achieving the efficient allocation of resources."); see also
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEET, ACUTE CARE EPISODE
DEMONSTRATION (2009), https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/
ACEFactSheet.pdf (announcing that the Secretary was using demonstration authority
under Social Security Act § 1866C to establish the Medicare Acute Care Episode
Demonstration).
86. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5007(a), 120 Stat. 4, 34
(2006) ("The Secretary shall establish a qualified gainsharing demonstration program
under which the Secretary shall approve demonstration projects . . . to test and evaluate
methodologies and arrangements between hospitals and physicians designed to govern
the utilization of inpatient hospital resources and physician work to improve the quality
and efficiency of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries and to develop improved
operational and financial hospital performance with sharing of remuneration as specified
in the project.").
87. AM. Hosp. Ass'N COMM. ON RESEARCH, BUNDLED PAYMENT: AHA RESEARCH
SYNTHESIS REPORT 6-7 (2010), http://www.hret.org/bundled/resources/
BundledPayment.pdf (noting that resulting increases in provider compliance with best
practices, improved 30-day clinical outcomes, and reduced average length of stay and 30-
day readmission rates achieved by the Geisinger Health System within its ProvenCare
payment model).
88. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVs., SOLICITATION FOR APPLICATIONS:
ACUTE CARE EPISODE DEMONSTRATION 8-9 (2009), https://www.cms.gov/
DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/ACESolicitation.pdf (explaining that ACE
Demonstration applicants are required to provide bids to establish a "bundled payment
rate for each episode of care included in the demonstration at that site," which will cover
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cardiovascular procedures and orthopedic procedures. 89  Additionally, in
establishing their bundled payment rate bids, Medicare ACE Demonstration
participants were required to provide a discount from the "estimated
Medicare Part A and Part B payments that would be made in absence of the
demonstration."90 CMS required that ACE Demonstration-participating
sites accept the single bundled payment as payment in full for each episode
of care, with the episode of care encompassing the entire hospital stay.91
This payment structure in some ways reflects Model Four in the Bundled
Payments for Care Improvement Initiative in that it focuses on a single
prospective payment for all hospital facility services and physician services
within prevalent hospital episodes such as coronary bypass and total knee
replacement.
Given that the Medicare ACE Demonstration has only been in operation
for two years and results are limited, it is helpful to assess the results of a
similar predecessor to the ACE Demonstration, the Medicare Participating
92Heart Bypass Center Demonstration. The Medicare Participating Heart
Bypass Center Demonstration tested a payment model consisting of a single
bundled payment for inpatient hospital services and physician services
associated with coronary artery bypass surgery. 93  This demonstration
project yielded impressive results, including a 10% reduction in Medicare
spending as compared to Medicare Part A and Part B expenditure levels that
would have otherwise been generated under traditional Medicare FFS
reimbursement.94
all Medicare Part A and Part B services for a given medical-severity diagnosis related
group (MS-DRG) under the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS),
noting that "these rates shall be specific to each hospital and DRG.").
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 8-9.
91. Id. at 9.
92. IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM, supra note 64.
93. JERRY CROMWELL ET AL., HEALTH ECON. RESEARCH, INC., MEDICARE
PARTICIPATING HEART BYPASS DEMONSTRATION: FINAL REPORT 5 (1998),
https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/Medicare Heart Bypass Execu
tiveSummary.pdf.
94. Id. at 11.
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Model Four in the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative
built on the Medicare ACE Demonstration, which in turn built on the
Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration. 9 5 Thus, Model
Four seems to hold tremendous promise for reducing Medicare costs
associated with inpatient surgery stays. If evidence from previous Medicare
bundled payment demonstrations proves determinative, Model Four could
succeed in aligning physician and hospital payments, thereby incentivizing
physicians to allocate services in a manner that more efficiently ensures that
actual Part A and Part B expenditures remain below the bundled payment
rate and allow for provider profit margins.
The Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration allowed for providers to enter
into "arrangements between a hospital and physician under which the
hospital provided for remuneration (gainsharing payments) to physicians ...
that represent solely a share of the savings incurred directly as a result of
collaborative efforts between the hospital and the physician to improve
overall quality and efficiency." 96 Essentially, the Medicare Gainsharing
Demonstration tested whether allowing physicians to share in profit margin
gains generated when hospitals hold Medicare Part A inpatient care costs
below capped diagnosis-related group ("DRG") payment levels (under the
Medicare IPPS) would foster partnerships between hospitals and physicians
to enhance quality and efficiency of hospital care.97
Thus far in the demonstration, two participating hospitals have been able
to allocate incentive payments stemming from improved profit margins
under the IPPS. However, CMS has determined that the demonstration has
maintained budget neutrality but has not achieved actual Medicare savings.98
It is difficult to assess the potential of Model One in the Bundled Payments
for Care Improvement Initiative through the lens of the Medicare
Gainsharing Demonstration, since the demonstration was designed with
95. Social Security Act § 11 15A(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1315(c)(1)(A) (2006).
96. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., NOTICE, MEDICARE PROGRAM:
SOLICITATION FOR PROPOSALS FROM RURAL HOSPITALS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MEDICARE
HOSPITAL GAINSHARING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM UNDER SECTION 5007 OF THE DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT (2006), https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/
DRA5007_FederalRegister.pdf.
97. Id. at 3.
98. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE GAINSHARING
DEMONSTRATION: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND SAVINGS 10-13
(2011), https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/BuczkoGain_SharingFinalReport
May_201 1.pdf
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budget neutrality, rather than specific Medicare savings, as its goal.
However, the gainsharing model seems to be the weakest of the bundled
payment class, as it does not tie physician services under Medicare Part B to
the bundled payment rate. As a result, the disconnect continues to exist
between volume-rewarding Medicare PFS physician reimbursement and
service volume-disincentivizing Medicare IPPS hospital payments.
Finally, the Geisinger Health System's ProvenCare® payment program
provides for a single, prospective consolidated charge for certain inpatient
procedures-coronary artery bypass graft, among others-that includes
preoperative care, surgery, and 90 days of follow-up treatment at a Geisinger
Health System facility.99 Since 2006, the ProvenCare@ system has yielded
improved quality performance and financial savings-including a 45%
decrease in hospital readmissions, a 16% reduction in average length of stay,
and a 5% reduction in hospital charges.100 By consolidating hospital and
physician service payments into one bundled payment rate, the
ProvenCare@ payment system mirrors Model Four in the Bundled Payments
for Care Improvement Initiative. In addition, the ProvenCare® success in
reducing total care costs and lengths of stay is a positive indicator for the
success of Model Four payments. It should also be noted that ProvenCare®
moves beyond merely bundling hospital and physician payments. Instead, it
actually incorporates follow-up post-acute care services into the
consolidated payment rate. Given the required inclusion of post-acute care
services in the National Pilot Program on Bundling,101 ProvenCare® results
can further serve as an encouraging case study on the potential Medicare
savings that can be generated through bundled payments.
99. DOUGLAS MCCARTHY ET AL., GEISINGER HEALTH SYSTEM: ACHIEVING THE
POTENTIAL OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION THROUGH INNOVATION, LEADERSHIP, MEASUREMENT




101. Medicare Program: Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,985 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 425).
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III. SYNERGY BETWEEN THE ACO MODEL AND BUNDLED PAYMENTS
A. Policy Background Supporting A CO-Bundled Payment Tandem
Tremendous value should be placed on ensuring the potential for the ACO
programs and the National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling to work in
tandem, rather than in separation. Observers should resist the temptation to
focus on ACO models and bundled payment models in a separate manner
and should not view bundled payments as simply an alternative option for
clinically integrated provider groups who do not wish to participate in the
ACO programs. In recommending an ACO program for Medicare,
MedPAC suggested that:
One potential difficulty with a bundling proposal is that
physicians will have new incentive to increase low-severity
hospitalization. They would profit because the payment amount
received would cover a patient with average resource needs,
whereas the low-severity patient they admitted would require low
time commitments from the physician. The incentive to keep
marginal cases out of the hospital would decrease. In contrast, the
ACO creates an incentive to reduce unnecessary admissions.
Therefore, the ACO may be seen as a necessary counterweight to
the effect that bundling would have on the number of
admissions.'02
Equally important, integrating bundled payments for episodes of care into
the provider payment structure within the context of ACOs could provide
disincentives for physicians to continue to drive up utilization.
Physicians in a one-sided model, or "bonus only" ACO, who are still
reimbursed by Medicare through fee-for-service, may find that the potential
for increased individual revenues attained via disbursement of ACO shared
savings (which, in turn, could be achieved through limiting excess
utilization) is outweighed by revenues that could be generated through
Medicare PFS reimbursement for growing service volume.lo3 While a
requirement for ACOs to eventually adopt the two-sided model of risk-
sharing may provide appropriate disincentives for physicians to maintain
certain levels of volume growth, incorporating bundled payments for
particular episodes of care within an expensive service line could provide a
manageable solution for ensuring volume containment.
102. BUNDLED PAYMENTS FOR CARE, supra note 52, at 5.
103. Medicare Program: Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,984-86.
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The implementation of bundled payments may also ease the transition
towards ACO formation and the application of the ACO payment model in
many settings that may not currently have the clinical and organizational
infrastructure in place to attain assignment of the statutory minimum of
5,000 beneficiaries for the MSSP. Researchers suggest that bundled
payments can act as a counterbalance to "the emphasis on primary care
typical of capitation or shared savings programs." While the 2010 health
reform law intends to create a shift in access and utilization towards primary
care services (and away from specialty service utilization), 05 the current
system may lack the primary care infrastructure needed to meet increased
demands for primary care in the near term. As such, bundled payments offer
a legitimate opportunity for the transition to comprehensive payments for
coordinated care during the primary care ramp-up.
B. Statutory Considerations
The extent to which the ACA's statutory provisions allow for providers to
receive incentive payments in both the ACO programs and the National Pilot
Program on Payment Bundling is a focal point in determining the prospects
for desired synergy between ACO and bundled payment initiatives.
Specifically, section 3022 of the ACA prohibits MSSP-enrolled Medicare
ACO providers from receiving incentive payments from other "shaved
savings" initiatives within Medicare. o0 Additionally, section 3021 of the
ACA prohibits the administration and testing of any pilot at CMMI (e.g., the
Pioneer ACO Program) that results in increased Medicare expenditures
relative to current law.' 07 This exclusion, in effect, would likely result in the
104. Robert E. Mechanic, Opportunities and Challenges for Episode-Based Payment,
365 NEw ENG. J. MED. 778 (2011), available at http://www.nejm.org/
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMpl105963.
105. Social Security Act § 1899(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006).
106. Social Security Act § 1899(b)(4) (requiring that a "provider of services or
supplier that participates in any of the following shall not be eligible to participate in an
ACO under this section: (A) A model tested or expanded under section 11 15A [i.e.
models tested by the CMS Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation] that involves
shared savings under this title, or any other program or demonstration project that
involves such shared savings.").
107. Social Security Act § 11 15A(b)(3)(B) (requiring that "The Secretary shall
terminate or modify the design and implementation of a model unless the Secretary
determines (and the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
with respect to program spending under the applicable title, certifies), after testing has
2012 3 19
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prohibition of the administration of a CMMI model where the model
participants receive duplicative shared savings payments.
CMS stated that because bundled payments within the Bundled Payments
for Care Improvement Initiative will in fact be formed as a discount program
rather than a shared savings program, participation in both an ACO program
and the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative would not be
prohibited by the ACA. os Based on this determination by CMS, one could
assume that participation in both an ACO program and the National Pilot
Program on Payment Bundling would likewise not be prohibited under the
ACA. Based on the discount structure inherent in the bundled payment
model (the same structure that is developed in the Bundled Payments for
Care Improvement Initiative), ACOs that also participate in the bundled
payment model could generate savings revenue through two distinct
avenues. Because these separate avenues are not overlapping or duplicative,
the simultaneously-earned savings revenues would not violate the ACA's
prohibition on duplicative shared savings. First, within the context of
bundled payments, the provider group would yield positive revenue margins
by holding service costs for a particular episode of care below the
discounted bundled payment rate. Second, the ACO would yield additional
revenue by holding total expenditures (including the discounted bundled
payments) below per-beneficiary spending benchmarks. In a sense, entering
into a bundled payment arrangement with CMS can be viewed simply as one
tactic that ACOs could use in holding down utilization growth to meet
shared savings benchmarks under the MSSP.
begun, that the model is expected to . . . (ii) reduce spending under the applicable title
without reducing the quality of care.").
108. BUNDLED PAYMENTS FOR CARE, supra note 52 (stating that "Under the theory that
healthcare transformation requires some synergy between new payment methods and care
improvement strategies, and the premise that the Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement initiative is not a shared savings program with Medicare, CMS encourages
entities to participate in the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative and the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, the Innovation Center Pioneer ACO and medical
home initiatives, and other shared savings initiatives[;]" but noting that "CMS reserves
the right to potentially subject these entities to additional requirements, modify program
parameters, or ultimately exclude participation in multiple programs, based on a number
of factors, including the capacity to avoid counting savings twice in interacting programs
and to conduct a valid evaluation of interventions.").
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IV. CHALLENGES IN THE PATH FORWARD FOR BOTH THE ACO AND
BUNDLED PAYMENT PROGRAMS
While the ACO programs and the National Pilot Program on Payment
Bundling carry tremendous potential for improving care and reducing costs,
the initiatives are not free of future challenges and unintended consequences.
The potential for ACO formation and integration stemming from bundled
payment participation may result in an over-concentration of the hospital
markets, which would come at the detriment of private payers and
consumers covered under private insurance. MedPAC and other researchers
have found hospital providers compensate for low Medicare reimbursement
rates in two distinct ways, depending on the concentration of the hospital
marketplace in the provider's area.' 0  Hospitals in markets where hospital
competition is extensive compensate for low Medicare reimbursement rates
by eliminating inefficiencies and more aggressively seeking to limit labor
and supply-chain-cost-growth.1 10  Meanwhile, hospitals in heavily
concentrated markets with fewer competing providers tend to compensate
for low Medicare rates by shifting costs to private payers, via negotiating
much higher payment rates from private insurers seeking to include the
hospital in its plan's network."' To the extent the latter occurs, ACO and
bundled payment savings to Medicare through cost-containment could
potentially come at the expense of those who maintain private insurance,
because private premiums will continue to increase as a result of increasing
hospital payment rate requirements for private payers.
While CMS's primary concern in this situation is containing Medicare
cost-growth, CMS should strive to ensure that these efforts to do not have a
harmful effect on cost containment in the private insurance market and the
overall health system. Observers correctly suggest that efforts to promote
the formation of ACOs may result in increased hospital marketplace
concentration through robust mergers and acquisitions activity as well as
provider consolidation." 2
109. James Robinson, Hospitals Respond to Medicare Payment Shortfalls By Both
Shifting Costs And Cutting Them, Based On Market Concentration, 30 HEALTH AFF.
1265, 1271 (2011).
110. Id at 1269.
111. Id
112. Id at 1270.
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In an attempt to address this potential adverse scenario, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued joint
statements of antitrust enforcement policy in connection with the final rule
on the establishment of the MSSP for ACOs. 113 The statement of antitrust
enforcement policy establishes an "antitrust safety zone" for ACOs with a
combined market share of clinical services provided, within a common
service category, of less than 30% within a geographic "Primary Service
Area" ("PSA").114 A "common service" is defined as a service provided to
patients by ACO participants within a PSA where two or more ACOs
operate. 115 The statement of antitrust enforcement policy clarifies that
ACOs falling within the safety zone will not be challenged on antitrust
grounds "absent extraordinary circumstances."116  However, ACOs with
greater than a 30% share of combined shares of common services within
their PSAs will be subject to FTC/DOJ antitrust scrutiny and may seek an
expedited voluntary review from the agencies to determine antitrust
compliance.' Finally, the statement of antitrust enforcement policy
explains that FTC and DOJ will apply a "rule of reason analysis" to
determine "whether collaboration [of the providers within the ACO] is likely
to have anticompetitive effects, and if so, whether the collaboration's
potential procompetitive efficiencies are likely to outweigh those effects.""
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting the ACA, lawmakers wisely laid the groundwork for delivery
system and payment reforms that strive to make the Medicare program more
113. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg.
67,026, 67,026-32 (Oct. 28, 2011).
114. Id. at 67,028.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 67,029-30.
118. Id. at 67,027 (establishing that, in assessing and weighing the anticompetitive
effects with potential procompetitive efficiencies, the agencies will the ACO under
standards of health care financial and clinical integration that have been articulated in
"various policy statements, speeches, business reviews, and advisory opinions" issued
and delivered by the agencies in the past).
ACOs and Bundled Payments
fiscally sustainable without reducing benefits or limiting patient access. The
forerunners in Medicare payment reform, the Medicare Shared Savings
Program and the National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, both hold
great promise for changing the trajectory of Medicare spending growth rates.
While the predecessors to the ACO model have had mixed results, some
evidence suggests that the two-sided model, and its requirement for ACOs to
assume risk of financial loss, can provide sufficient incentives for providers
to hold down costs. Similarly, bundling payments to hospitals and
physicians for care delivered in connection with an inpatient hospital stay
can help to finally ensure alignment in Medicare reimbursement that
encourages improved efficiency amongst providers.
However, these programs will need to continue to be implemented with
flexibility in order to achieve provider "buy-in" to the programs and to allow
for provider groups to simultaneously participate in both models. This
simultaneous participation in ACO models and bundled payment models is
critical in balancing incentives to control expenditure growth at the global
Medicare population-based level with incentives to control cost growth per
episode of care. Finally, rigorous antitrust reviews of provider relationships
stemming from participation in the two models will be necessary to protect
against the over-concentration of provider and hospital markets. The future
for both models is bright, but their success will be dictated by
implementation decisions made by regulators in the coming years.
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